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December 10, 2013
Joanna L. Grossman

De Facto Parentage and the Rights of Former Stepparents

Does a former stepfather have the right to custody or visitation of
a stepchild he helped raise from birth? This question was recently answered by the Washington State Supreme
Court, in In re Custody of B.M.H. The rights of nonparents to custody and visitation have been in flux in many
states over the last decade, but perhaps nowhere as much as Washington State.
It was a Washington State case that gave rise to the U.S. Supreme Court ruling, Troxel v. Granville
(http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/530/57/) (2000), which upended the law of thirdparty visitation and
forced many states to revisit the standards that they had previously applied when deciding disputes between
parents and nonparents. In Troxel’s wake, Washington State courts began to take a hard line on claims by non
parents, having been rebuked by the High Court for giving insufficient regard to constitutionally protected
parental rights. But with this new ruling, the state’s highest court, sitting en banc, takes a step back toward its
previous approach by allowing a former stepfather to pursue recognition as a de facto parent.
In re B.M.H.
Michael and Laurie Holt had a child, C.H., in 1995, after spending two years in a romantic relationship. There is
no question about the legal ties of both Michael and Laurie to this child, who was biologically related to both of
them and whom they coparented. But what about the child’s younger sibling, who was born four years later?
This second child had a different biological father—a man to whom Laurie became engaged after she and
Michael broke up in 1998. Three months into this second pregnancy, however, Laurie’s fiancé was killed in an
industrial accident.
Michael then came back into the picture during Laurie’s second pregnancy. He was present at the child’s birth
and cut the umbilical cord. He and Laurie then married shortly after the child, B.M.H., was born. For the first two
years of life, B.M.H. was cared for by Michael and Laurie living together in the same household. After they
divorced in 2001, the parties agreed to a parenting plan that gave Laurie primary residential custody of C.H. and
visitation every other weekend to Michael. Although the parenting plan did not expressly cover the second child,
B.M.H. followed the same visitation schedule as C.H. And even after the couple divorced, Laurie changed
C.M.H.’s last name from the biological father’s to Michael’s. Adoption was also discussed, but Laurie and
Michael decided not to pursue it because of its adverse effects on C.M.H.’s ability to collect survivor’s benefits
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through his biological father.
For many years after they divorced, Laurie and Michael continued to coparent both children. Laurie had a series
of relationships, including another brief marriage, the onset of which would often trigger a threat by Laurie to
minimize or eliminate C.M.H.’s time with Michael. It was a situation like this that gave rise to the lawsuit at
issue, in which Michael sought formal recognition of his parentchild relationship with C.M.H. Laurie revealed
plans to move to another city 50 miles away with a new boyfriend. Michael filed a petition for “nonparental
custody” on the basis that such a move would “disrupt the close relationship” he had with C.M.H., a child to
which he claimed to be “extremely bonded” and the “child’s father in all respects.”
Michael’s suit raised two questions that made their way to the state’s highest court: (1) Did Michael allege
sufficient harm to justify transferring custody from a parent to a nonparent?; and (2) Could a former stepparent
like Michael qualify as a “de facto parent,” who might have the right to custody or visitation despite his lack of
legal parent status? Both of these questions require an understanding of who qualifies as a legal parent and the
ways in which parents differ from nonparents, as I will explain.
Parents v. NonParents: A Question of Federal Constitutional Significance
A legal parent is someone who, by virtue of a particular tie to a child, is endowed with constitutionally protected
rights, and subject to potentially onerous obligations. A biological mother is a legal parent unless and until her
parental rights are terminated. A biological father is a legal parent if he is married to the child’s mother at the
time of conception or birth, or if some other criterion for fatherhood is met—such as an adjudication or
acknowledgment of paternity, or his openly holding out the child as his own.
The difference between a parent and a nonparent has always been meaningful, but it became ever more so after
the Supreme Court’s 2000 decision in Troxel v. Granville, in which the Court drew a stark line. The distinction
between legal parents and legal strangers is paramount in determining the rights that various adults have with
respect to the care, custody, and visitation of children. A battle for custody between two legal parents, neither of
whom has been declared legally unfit, is straightforwardly about the best interests of the child. The court asks the
following question: Given a variety of factors, which parent is best suited to have custody? But a battle between a
parent and a nonparent is completely different.
It is virtually impossible for a nonparent to successfully obtain legal custody of a child who has at least one fit
parent. Visitation is sometimes possible—but it may be hard to come by. In Troxel, a plurality of the Supreme
Court concluded that a Washington State law that allowed any third party to petition for visitation with a child at
any time was unconstitutional as applied to Tommie Granville, a mother who had sought to limit visitation by her
children’s paternal grandparents after their father’s suicide. The Court in that case cited the substantive due
process right of parents to make decisions regarding the care, custody, and control of their children unless they
have been declared unfit: The law must presume that fit parents act in the best interests of their children, and give
“special weight” to their decisions about, among other things, who should be able to spend time with their
children.
In the wake of Troxel, many state courts have ruled on the validity of their respective thirdparty visitation
statutes. Those that survived review built in a strong preference for deferring to a legal parent’s decision about
visitation with third parties. Those that didn’t treated parents and nonparents closer to equals.
In Washington State, the postTroxel decisions have been careful to show more respect for parental rights,
sometimes at the expense of children’s best interests.
The Rights of Former Stepparents, and Michael Holt’s Claim for Nonparent Custody
Generally, when a relationship is created by marriage—as in the case of a stepparent or a mother or brotherin
law—it terminates when the marriage is dissolved. A stepparent becomes, in essence, a legal stranger to his or
her stepchildren upon divorce from the children’s parent.
Unless state law provides otherwise, the end of the marriage spells the end of any contact with the children
http://verdict.justia.com/2013/12/10/defactoparentagerightsformerstepparents
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without the continuing acquiescence of the parent. In California, for example, a statute allows a court to grant
“reasonable visitation” by a stepparent when he or she divorces a child’s legal parent.
Third parties like former stepparents can also, in some states, petition for nonparent custody. The State of
Washington provides for this possibility. But because of the special constitutional protection given to legal
parents, the statute precludes granting nonparent custody without a showing that the legal parent is unfit (a tough
standard) or that custody with a parent would result in “actual detriment to the child’s growth and development.”
Michael’s claim revolved around Laurie’s pattern of engaging in intense, shortterm relationships and allowing
those relationships to interfere with his relationship with C.M.H. Since he is the only father C.M.H. has ever
known, Michael claimed that her plan to immediately relocate to another city would be harmful to C.M.H. by
cutting off his access to Michael. Although the court seemed sympathetic to Michael’s claim—and concerned
about Laurie’s behavior—it concluded that Michael had not made a showing of actual harm, because while
Laurie had said she might terminate contact between Michael and C.M.H., she had not yet done so. A showing of
actual detriment, the court decided, required more immediate evidence of harm to justify overriding the custodial
rights of a fit parent.
Michael Holt’s Claim for De Facto Parentage
Alternatively, Michael claimed that he should be treated as a de facto parent, an adult who is not a legal parent,
but has functioned as a social or psychological parent nonetheless. Despite the conventional wisdom about the
hierarchy between parents and nonparents, some jurisdictions recognize this middleground status. While some
states, such as New York, have rejected this status outright (a development I have described in a previous
column (http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20100511.html) ), several states have recognized the de facto
parentage doctrine to recognize a quasiparent status based on a functional parentchild relationship.
This doctrine was first recognized in a 1995 Wisconsin case, In re Custody of H.S.H.K
(http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9444398073080790210) , and has been adopted in a few other
jurisdictions since then. In its typical formulation, the doctrine requires not only that the coparent function as a
parent, but also that the legal parent consented to the creation of the functional parentchild relationship and
actively fostered its growth. Although the doctrine varies from state to state, it typically does not give rise to
rights equivalent to a legal parent’s. Rather, it allows the de facto parent to seek visitation, but not custody.
Courts in states that recognize de facto parentage justify the intrusion into the legal mother’s constitutionally
protected parental rights by pointing to her role in creating and fostering the relationship with the coparent.
The Washington Supreme Court has recognized de facto parentage as a viable doctrine under state law. In In re
Parentage of L.B. (2005), the court applied it in a dispute between a biological mother and her lesbian partner.
The two women had agreed to become parents together, and one of them was inseminated and gave birth to a
child. Under Washington law, only the biological mother had legal parent status, but the court recognized her
partner as a de facto parent. The court acknowledged de facto parentage as an equitable remedy that could be
used to fill statutory gaps in parentage law. The law at the time provided no mechanism by which a lesbian co
parent could attain parental rights despite longstanding and deep involvement in parenting her partner’s child. In
that case, the doctrine of de facto parentage allowed the court to award some residential time to the coparent,
despite her lack of legal parent status.
The court reconciled the doctrine with the biological mother’s constitutionallyprotected parental rights by
requiring, as one prong of the test, that the biological parent must have consented to and facilitated the
relationship between the child and the nonparent. Proving oneself to qualify as a de facto parent is, the court
wrote, “no easy task.” The status is “limited to those adults who have fully and completely undertaken a
permanent, unequivocal, committed, and responsible parental role in the child’s life.”
Although de facto parentage seems like a good fit for Michael Holt, who was encouraged to assume the role of
C.M.H.’s father from birth, and to continue in that role for years after he and Laurie divorced, a later ruling from
the Washington State high court made his suit more difficult. In that ruling, Corbin v. Reimen (discussed here
(http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/grossman/20100413.html) ), the court ruled against an exstepfather who was trying to
maintain strong parental ties with his former stepdaughter “M.F.” by seeking recognition as a de facto parent. As
http://verdict.justia.com/2013/12/10/defactoparentagerightsformerstepparents
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with Michael Holt, M.F.’s stepfather was encouraged to maintain a parental role after he divorced M.F.’s mother.
No distinction was made between his biological children of the marriage and his stepchild. After more than a
decade of coparenting (both during marriage and after the divorce), the child’s mother stopped sending M.F. for
visitation. His former stepfather then sued and asked to be recognized as a de facto parent.
The Washington Supreme Court denied the stepfather’s request, ruling that “M.F.’s legal parents and their
respective roles were already established under our statutory scheme,” and that the former stepfather had entered
the relationship “as a stepparent, a third party to M.F.’s two existing parents.” The court reasoned that
recognizing the former stepfather as a de facto parent would, in essence, enlarge his rights and potentially
infringe on the parental rights of M.F.’s legal parents. As a stepparent, the court concluded, Corbin could only
obtain custody (as opposed to simply visitation) over a legal parent’s objection upon a showing of either parental
unfitness or actual detriment to the child—both of which showings set very high standards.
One reading of Corbin is that a former stepparent is barred, categorically, from being treated as a de facto parent.
But the majority in In re C.M.H., the recent case, rejected that interpretation. Although the legislature has passed
new laws to deal with a broader array of family forms—including those formed by samesex couples that become
parents together—the court reasoned that those laws “do not provide the exclusive basis for obtaining parental
rights and responsibilities.” Rather, the majority explained: “Where the legislature remains silent with respect to
determinations of parentage because it cannot anticipate every way that a parentchild relationship forms, we will
continue to invoke our common law responsibility to ‘respond to the needs of children and families in the face of
changing realities.’”
The question, then, was whether existing statutory law adequately provided for situations like the one facing
Michael Holt—and whether he, like M.F.’s former stepfather, was precluded from attaining status as a de facto
parent. The majority saw the two cases differently, however. For M.F., two biological parents divorced and
shared responsibilities under a custody and visitation agreement. The former stepfather was a third wheel, in the
court’s eyes, who could only gain parental time under the mechanism reserved for nonparents—by proving the
unfitness of the biological parents or proving actual detriment to M.F. from being deprived of contact with his
former stepfather.
For Michael Holt, the situation was different. C.M.F.’s father was dead before he was born, and Michael stepped
into an “unequivocal and permanent parental role with the consent of all existing parents.” Such a person “does
not have a statutorily protected relationship,” but “justice prompts [the court] to apply the de facto parent test.”
This approach, in the majority’s view, “adequately balances the rights of biological parents, children, and other
parties.”
This ruling does not mean that Michael Holt will win his case, but it does mean that he will have the opportunity,
on remand, to prove that he qualifies as a de facto parent. Given the apparent depths of his involvement with
C.M.H. in a parenttype relationship, it seems likely that he will succeed in this endeavor.
One justice dissented in part; three dissented in full. Although they raised several points in dissent, the most
compelling among them is the question whether this ruling alters the general treatment of former stepparents. An
obvious concern, as one justice wrote, is that the parent is “highly likely to encourage her spouse, the stepparent,
in pursuit of a harmonious family life that includes a loving relationship with her child together with shared
responsibilities of childrearing.” But that encouragement, the Court said, may “not mean that the parent consents
to a permanent, lifelong parentchild relationship between her child and the stepparent if the marriage should
end.” Yet, the de facto parent test looks first and foremost to the consent and active fostering by the parent as an
indicator of intent to share parental status. But when the marriage ends, is the inference of consent still justified
by the spouseparent’s behavior during the marriage?
It is true that broadly granting stepparents the right to insist on continuing parentchild relationships after divorce
from the spouseparent would fundamentally alter the way we conceive of stepparent and stepchild relationships
—as well as the way we conceive of the parental rights of the spouseparent, a cornerstone of which is the right
to exclude other adults from a child’s life. But the ruling in C.M.H. need not lead to this result. The majority was
careful to emphasize the need for casebycase application of the de facto parentage doctrine and the
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unattractiveness of categorical rules. And the one fact that made Michael Holt’s claim seem most compelling—
that he stepped into a parental role before birth (indeed, before he was married to C.M.H.’s mother) and as the
only father the child ever had—is a fact that will not be true of most stepparents. His parentlike relationship with
C.M.H. both preceded and outlasted his marriage to the child’s mother. So it is perhaps unfair to lump him in
with all stepparents, who are presumed to derive parentchild relationships solely from marriage to a child’s
parent. Because of this distinction, the ruling may not have broad application or lead to the parade of dangers that
was raised by the dissenters.
Cases like C.M.H raise difficult questions, to be sure. And they highlight a troubling fact about our current laws
of parentage: They turn primarily on the interests and rights of adults, rather than on the interests and needs of
children. In allowing Michael Holt to pursue his de facto parentage claim, the Washington Supreme Court may
have recalibrated that balance more in favor of children, without sacrificing the important constitutional rights of
parents.
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